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STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF MARYE. RATLIFF, 
Deceased 
EARL McLAIN et al. and FIRST 
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
MAYBELLE R. CONRAD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10604 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This was a probate proceeding instituted on the petition 
of Earl McLain and certain other legatees named in the 
purported last will and testament of Mary E. Ratliff, De-
ceased. The appellant objected to the admission to pro-
bate of instruments which were not the originals of the 
said purported will and a codicil thereto. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court below admitted the purported will and codicil 
to probate upon the production and proof of a certified 
copy thereof. The court denied appellant's motion for 
new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's Order Ad-
mitting Will to Probate and remand of the proceedings to 
to said court with instructions that the original instru-
ments must be deposited with the court before any further 
hearing is conducted toward admission of will to probate. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mary E. Ratliff died on June 20, 1965, in Arapahoe 
County, Colorado [R-1, Petition for Probate of Will (Cor-
rected)]. The original of an instrument purporting to be 
decedent's last will and testament dated October 6, 1961, 
and the original first codicil thereto dated May 1, 1962, 
were lodged with the Clerk of the District Court in and 
for Douglas County, Colorado, on July 13, 1965 [R-12, 
Clerk's Certificate]. 
A Petition for Probate of Will, to which was attached 
a photo copy of the purported will, was filed with the 
Clerk of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for 
Uintah County, Utah, on November 19, 1965, by several 
of the legatees under said purported will [R-1]. A Petition 1 
for Probate of Will was filed with the Douglas County, 
Colorado, Court on November 26, 1965 by appellant, a 
legatee and sole heir of decedent [R-15, Answer to De-
mand for Original Will]. The Uintah County proceed-
ing was held in abeyance pending admission of the Will 
to probate in Colorado. However, a will contest developed 
in the Colorado proceeding whereupon the Uintah Coun-
ty hearing was set for January 4, 1966 [R-15]. 
2 
At the hearing on January 4, 1966, in the court below, 
a copy of the instruments lodged with the Clerk of the 
District Court in Douglas County, Colorado, certified by 
the Clerk, were introduced [R-24, 25, T-5, 6]. Ralph 
Sargent, the sole surviving attesting witness, testified 
from these copies [R-24, T-5] and they were admitted in 
evidence [R-31, T-12]. Upon the testimony of Ralph 
Sargent concerning the circumstances surrounding the 
execution of the purported will and codicil [R-23, 24, T-4, 
SJ, the testimony of Amelia Manker as to the decedent's 
presence in Vernal, Utah, during the spring of 1965 and 
references to a house in which decedent lived and a car 
which she drove [R-27, 28, T-8, 9] and the testimony of 
Morris Cook as to decedent's voting in the 1964 election 
[R-29, 30, T-10, 11 ], the "will" was admitted to probate 
rR-31, 33, T-12, 14]. Appellant repeatedly objected to the 
proceeding and moved to stay proceedings pending pro-
duction of the original purported will and codicil, but 
these objections were overruled. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
A WILL CANNOT BE ADMITTED TO PROBATE 
CPON THE PRODUCTION AND PROOF OF A CER-
TIFIED COPY WHEN THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT 
IS KNOWN TO BE IN EXISTENCE AND LODGED 
IN ANOTHER COURT OF PROBATE. 
Prior to the marvels of modern photo copy equipment 
this case could never have arisen because a certified copy 
would have borne no necessary resemblance to the original 
of the certified document. Thus, it would have been im-
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possible to establish the legal status of a purported will 
upon production and execution of a certified copy. 
We submit that the advent of the photo copy machine 
has not caused such a deterioration in the worth of an 
original will that it will no longer be required for probate 
purposes. Further, the fact that the original will is held bv 
some responsible party and that he has certified a certai~ 
photo copy to be a copy of the original will should not suf-
fice in lieu of the original itself. 
The Probate Code consistently uses the word "will" not 
"certified copy of will" except in special circumstances 
noted hereinafter. For example, 75-1-2 provides that wills 
must be proved; 75-3 is replete with the word will. (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
On the other hand, the legislature has in several cases 
clearly authorized the use of copies of wills in probate 
proceedings. 75-3-23 relating to probate of foreign wills 
specifically states that copies of wills, duly authenticated, 
are adequate. 75-3-25, 26 and 27 relating to proof of lost 
or destroyed wills also clearly contemplate the use of 
copies upon proof that the will was in existence and has 
been lost or destroyed. Neither of these situations are ap-
plicable in the instant case. 
In this connection the case of In re Frandsen's Will, 50 
U. 156, 167 P. 362 (1917) is noteworthy. This case in-
volved proof of a lost or destroyed will which had at one 
time been recorded in the county clerk's office. The \\:ill 
was shown to have been in existence when the testator 
became mentally incompetent and, therefore, the court 
held that the will must have been in effect at her death. 
The court did not permit proof of the will, however, by 
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introduction of the county clerk's record. The court said 
in passing that anyone having compared the record with 
the original could have testified to the correctness of the 
copy and the copy could then have been used as an ex-
amined copy of the original. We note, then, that even in 
the case of a lost or destroyed will a copy is not independent 
evidence of a will except under the rule of examined copy. 
Cases supporting the proposition that probate proceed-
ings must be stayed until production of the original will 
include In re Barney's Will, 94 N.J. Eq. 392, 120 A. 513 
(1923), and In re De Buck's Estate, 125 N.J. Eq. 80, 4 A.2d 
309 (1939). An earlier New Jersey case, In re Morrissey's 
Will, 91 N.J. Eq. 289, 107 A. 70 (1919), held that produc-
tion of the original will is jurisdictional. See Page On Wills, 
§26.37 (1961). 
Those seeking probate in Uintah County might contend 
that they had no alternative but to proceed without the 
original will. This would not be the case. The will and 
codicil having been lodged with the District Court in 
Douglas County, Colorado, any of the petitione1s, partic-
ularly the Executor named in the will, could have peti-
tioned for probate in that court at any time. Colorado Re-
vised Statutes 1963, 153-5-22. In the alternative, petition-
ers could have challenged the jurisdiction of the Court in 
Douglas County to probate the will, and if successful, 
could have had the will transferred to the Court in Uintah 
County, Utah. Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, 153-5-23; 
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 450. Instead, Peti-
tioners simply demanded that counsel for appellant for-
ward the original will [R-13]. Counsel was, of course, 
unable to comply with this demand, the will and codicil 
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having been formally lodged with the Court in Douglas 
County, Colorado. 
Legal authority requiring production of the original will 
for probate, where not proved to have been lost or de-
stroyed, is supported by sound reason. Among a number of 
potentially serious problems to be noted in connection with 
the creation of any precedent permitting the probate of 
certified copies of wills where the original is in existence 
and is lodged with another court of probate are the follow-
ing: 
I. The traditional inviolability of the will is jeopar- ' 
dized. This challenges the very essence of wills and pro-
bate. 
2. The problem of proof is at once apparent and the 
safeguards embodied in our law since the Statute of Wills 
are needlessly weakened. 
3. Several probates can be initiated and conducted at 
the same time with conflicting results. Comity may or may 
not prevent collision courses from developing. 
In summary, the court below erred in admitting to pro-
bate as the will of Mary E. Ratliff a document which was 
a certified copy of an instrument lodged with another 
court of probate. The Order Admitting Will to Probate 
should, therefore, be reversed and the court directed to 
stay proceedings on any Petition for Probate until the 




EVIDENCE OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS FOR 
PRO BA TE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
ORDER OF THE COURT ADMITTING THE WILL 
TO PROBATE. 
In addition to the error urged in the first argument, it 
is submitted that petitioners introduced insufficient evi-
dence at the hearing on January 4, 1966, to support the 
allegations of jurisdiction made in the Petition for Probate. 
These jurisdictional grounds were residence in Uintah 
County and property located in Uintah County at the 
time of decedent's death [R-1]. 
The only evidence as to decedent's residence \Vas testi-
mony of Amelia Manker that the decedent had been in 
Vernal for three or four months during the spring of 1965 
[R-27, T-8], and the testimony of Morris Cook that she 
had voted in 1964 [R-30, T-11 ]. Nothing appears as to de-
cedent's domicile or intentions at the time of her death. 
Evidence of decedent's property in Vernal was limited 
to Amelia Manker's passing reference to the decedent's 
house [R-27, T-8] and a car driven by decedent and which 
was variously located in front of the laundry-mat and at 
her garage. No evidence was introduced as to the nature 
of decedent's ownership interest, if any, in these assets. 
By virtue of petitioners' failure to support these juris-
dictional allegations, therefore, it is submitted that the 
court below erred in admitting the "will" to probate and 
the Order Admitting Will to Probate should be reversed. 
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III. 
APPELLANT COMPLIED SUBSTANTIALLY WITH ' 
RULE 73(a) IN PERFECTING THIS APPEAL AND 
THE COURT MAY EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DETERMINING WHETHER UNDER ALL THE CIR-
CUMSTANCES THE APPEAL SHOULD BE AL-
LOWED. 
Respondents have moved to dismiss this appeal upon 
the grounds that this Court lacks jurisdiction. The manner 
in which the appeal was filed is alleged as the basis for this 
motion to dismiss. 
Rule 73(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
"A party may appeal from a judgment by filing 
with the district court a notice of appeal, togeth-
er with sufficient copies thereof for mailing to the 
Supreme Court and all other parties to the judg-
ment, and depositing therewith the fee required 
for docketing the appeal in the Supreme Court." 
The rule allows one month from the entry of judgment 
\vithin which an appeal may be taken. 
In this case motion for new trial was denied March l, 
1966, and appellant had until April 1, 1966, to take her 
appeal. A Notice of Appeal was in fact received by the 
Clerk of the District Court and by counsel for respondents 
on Friday, April 1, 1966, through the United States mails, 
from counsel for appellant in Roosevelt, Utah. Monday, 
April 4, 1966, the Clerk received in the same manner ad-
ditional copies of the Notice of Appeal for attorneys for 
respondents. Friday, April 8, 1966, the Clerk received the 
filing fee of $3.50 and only then filed the Notice of Appeal. 
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It is to be noted that counsel for appellant was in Roose-
velt, Utah, whereas the District Court was in Vernal. 
Counsel did not have the convenience of proximity with 
the filing office nor the benefit of communication from the 
filing office as to the absence of copies and fee which were 
required. Had use of the mails not been necessary, and had 
personal contact been made between the filing office and 
counsel, both of which under other circumstances are 
likely, the situation as to copies of the Notice of Appeal 
and the filing fee would not have occurred. 
No decision of this Court has been uncovered interpret-
ing the present rule as jurisdictional insofar as copies nf 
the Notice and filing fee are concerned. The essence of 
the rule is notice to the trial court that an appeal will be 
taken. Appellant more than fulfilled this condition by mail-
ing to the Clerk of the District Court and to opposing 
counsel a Notice of Appeal which was received within the 
prescribed one month period. Rule 73(a) does not con-
template that any further action need be accomplished 
within the one month period by virtue of the fact that the 
Notice may be filed the last day of such period. 
Appellant concedes that this Court has broad discretion 
in determining what disposition is to be made of an appeal 
involving timeliness of procedural steps. It is submitted 
that the significance of this case, together with the cir-
cumstances surrounding the taking of the appeal, warrant 
the use of the Court's discretion in favor of a decision on 
the merits. The respondents' motion to dismiss should, 
therefore, be denied and the case heard and determined 
on its merits. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Order Admitting Will to Probate entered by the 
Court below is contrary to the law and evidence of this 
case. To allow this order to stand would create precedent 
for a new method of probate not recognized by any statute 
or court in the United States. Such a departure is solely 
a matter of legislative concern not judicial decision. For 
these reasons the Order Admitting Will to Probate should 
be reversed and the case remanded. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JO 
R. EARL DILLMAN 
Roosevelt, Utah 
Tel. 20 
HOLLAND & HART, 
BRUCE T. BUELL 
500 Equitable Bldg. 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Tel. 303-292-9200 
As attorneys for 
May belle R. Conrad, 
Appellant. 
